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Equal Protection for Unmarried
Cohabitors: An Insider's Look at
Marvin v. Marvin

MARVIN M. MITCHELSON*
WILLIAM J. GLUCKSMAN**

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is time to reevaluate the legal distinctions separating alternative types of familial relationships. We are witnessing a profound revolution of domestic lifestyle, which has become appa-

rent in the growing legion of persons cohabitating without the
blessings of clergy or the marriage license.' The increase in nonmarital familial relationships is indicative of the fragmentation
B.A., University of California at Los Angeles, 1953; J.D., Southwestern
University School of Law, 1956. Mr. Mitchelson is engaged in private practice in
Los Angeles, New York City and London, England, concentrating in the field of
domestic relations. He successfully represented the plaintiff, Michelle Tirola
Marvin, in the celebrated Marvin case. Mr. Mitchelson is a frequent lecturer at
family law seminars and has appeared as a panelist on television and radio
programs.
** B.A., University of California at Los Angeles, 1973; J.D., Southwestern
University School of Law, 1976. Member of California Bar. Mr. Glucksman is
now an associate in the Law Offices of Marvin M. Mitchelson.
1. "The 1970 census indicates that today perhaps eight times as many
couples are living together without being married as cohabited ten years ago."
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 665, n.1, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 818 n.1, 557 P.2d 106,
109 n.1 (1976), citing Comment, In re Cary: A Judicial Recognition of Illicit
Cohabitation,25 HASTINGS L.J. 1226 (1974). Since 1970, Census Bureau figures
show that the number of unmarried people of the opposite sex living together
has doubled, from 644,000 to 1.3 million, NEWSWEEK, August 1, 1977, at 46.
*

that has occurred in the family structure over the last hundred
years.2 Those traditionalists who remain critical of societal
changes are unable to accept the reality of the staggering statist3
ics on broken families.
The California Supreme Court squarely addressed itself to

5
4
the changing mores of the day when, in Marvin v. Marvin, it

declared that prior laws governing the distribution of property
acquired during a nonmarital relationship are inconsistent with
contemporary social realities. Marvin outlines the property
rights of nonmarital cohabitators upon termination of their relationship under the guise of contract principles and rules of
equity and fair play.6 The essence of Marvin is that relief will be
provided to the dependent partner in as equitable a manner as
the facts of each case warrant.7 The legal system of a society
2. The family unit in America developed in an agrarian society in which

the conduct and duties of each family member were rigidly defined. During this
time, the family was the most efficient economic unit of production and therefore the practical center of society. In the industrialized society, however, with
economy based on technology and specialization of labor, the individual rather
than the family has become the basic unit of production.
3. Statistics obtained from the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the State of
California show that the number of divorces in the state has increased over
100% in ten years while the number of marriages has remained nearly constant.
In 1966, for example, 69,145 couples received a divorce decree, while 144,129
couples obtained marriage licenses. In 1976, 133,363 couples were divorced and
147,451 couples married. Drawing conclusions from statistics which are somewhat inaccurate (thousands of California couples are married in Nevada) is
misleading. One fact is apparent, however: if one considers that an average
family consists of two parents and two children, then in 1976, 533,462 people
suffered through a marital breakdown.
4. Justice Cardozo wrote in a celebrated essay, "A rule which in its origin
was the creation of the courts themselves and was supposed in the making to
express the mores of the day, may be abrogated by courts when the mores are so
changed that perpetuation of the rule would do violence to the social conscience
• . .",CORDOzo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, 136-137 (2d ed. Greenwood Reprinting,
1975).

5. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
6. Id. at 665, 557 P.2d at 1"10, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819, wherein the court
concluded:
(1) The provisions of the Family Law Act do not govern the distribution
of property acquired during a nonmarital relationship; such a relationship remains subject solely to judicial decision. (2) The courts should
enforce express contracts between nonmarital partners except to the
extent that the contract is explicitly founded on the consideration of
meretricious sexual services. (3) In the absence of n express contract,
the courts should inquire into the conduct of the larties to determine
whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract, agreement of
partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between
the parties. The courts may also employ the doctrine of quantum meruit,
or equitable remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts, when
warranted by the facts of the case.
7. Besides the rights and remedies so generously expounded in Marvin,
see note 6, supra, the court also said:
Our opinion does not preclude the evolution of additional equitable
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which now accepts nonmarital cohabitation must protect the
reasonable expectations 8 of those persons choosing this alternative lifestyle. This spirit embodied in Marvin will have profound
nationwide implications, as its underlying philosophy will be
adopted, legislatively or judically, by every state in the union
within five to ten years. One state court recently relied entirely
upon Marvin in affirming an equal distribution of property
acquired during a nonmarital relationship, much the same as
had the parties been married.9
One of the arguments submitted to the California Supreme
Court in the Marvin case was that the distinction made in
California between married and unmarried persons raises serious constitutional questions. 10 It was argued that refusal to
grant relief to a woman who has lived with a man as his wife in
all respects except ceremony denies her equal protection of the
law when such refusal is based on her nonmarital status, even
though that status arose from a marital-type family relationship. However, on superficial reading of Justice Tobriner's deciremedies to protect the expectations of the parties to a nonmarital
relationship in cases in which existing remedies prove inadequate; the
suitability of such remedies may be determined in later cases in light of
the factual setting in which they arise.
Thus the court left the nature of the equitable remedy virtually unrestricted and
unlimited. Id. at 684, n.25, 557 P.2d at 123 n.25, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832 n.25.
8. The expectations of two people who decide to live together, though not
based upon the belief that they are married, are nevertheless based upon certain
elements of marriage that are implicit in any situation in which lovers engage
each other to share their lives together. Namely, there are expectations of
mutual support, companionship and enjoyment of the fruits of labor that come
out of the relationship.
9. Carlson v. Olsen, 256 N.W.2d 249 ( Minn. 1977); The court exercised its
general equitable powers to protect what the evidence at trial indicated were the
reasonable expectations of the parties. The division on an equal basis was made
on the theory that the man had made an irrevocable gift to the woman (of the
assets purchased solely with his earnings) for her "wifely and motherly services" during a 21 year period of nonmarital cohabitation. The Minnesota Supreme Court relied heavily upon the Marvin decision.
Another case relying on Marvin is pending before the Supreme Court of
Nevada and is scheduled for oral argument just after this article is published;
Warren v. Warren No. A117550 (8th Judicial District, Clark County, Las Vegas,
Nevada, filed Oct. 7, 1976).
10. The constitutional questions raised in Michelle Marvin's Petition For
Hearing to the Supreme Court of the State of California concerned the equal
protection of the laws, due process, and the rights of privacy, association and
contract. By granting contract rights, the court made moot the constitutional
issues pertaining thereto.

sion, it appears that the status of the relationship does not have
a determinative effect upon the relief accorded. The court apparently bases its decision solely on contract principles, which,
prior to Marvin, were either applied in an inconsistent manner"
or were limited on policy grounds now antiquated. 12 The court
went so far as to conclude that the provisions of the Family Law
Act" do not govern the distribution of property acquired during
a nonmarital relationship. 14 Thus, it would appear that the court
is perpetuating the distinction between marital-type relationships.
A closer analysis of the case, however, betrays the court's true
intentions. The court was not prepared to expand the Family
Law Act beyond the intentions of the legislature, and therefore
expressly rejected the interpretation of Cary15 that the Act requires an equal division of property acquired in nonmarital
family relationships. 6 Instead, the court confessed that the
legislature never even considered the issue of the property
rights of nonmarital partners." In order to provide unmarried
cohabitors the same remedies as the Family Law Act provides
for married persons, the court granted unusual equitable re18
lief.
As the court did not specifically address itself to the constitutional arguments posed, the basic thrust of this article will be to
demonstrate that discrimination on the basis of marital status
cannot be constitutionally tolerated. California's willingness to
ameliorate the disparity of treatment accorded nonmarital
cohabitors is indicated by a discussion of recent legislative
amendments couched in terms consistent with the Constitution.
A discussion of a general misunderstanding of the Marvin case
11. The Marvin court stated:
Thus in summary, the cases prior [In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App.
3d 345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1973)] exhibited schizophrenic inconsistency.
By enforcing an express contract between nonmarital partners unless it
rested upon an unlawful consideration, the courts applied a common
law principle as to contracts. Yet the courts disregarded the common
law principle that holds that implied contracts can arise from the
conduct of the parties. 18 Cal. 3d at 678, 557 P.2d at 118, 134 Cal. Rptr. at
827.
12. Contracts, which called for the parties to live together as husband and
wife, were held to be illegal as contrary to good morals. See e.g. Updeck v.
Samuel,. 123 Cal. App. 2d 264, 266 P. 2d 822 (1954); Heaps v. Toy, 54 Cal. App. 2d
178, 128 P. 2d 813 (1942).
13. CAL. Cxv. CODE

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

§§

4000-5000 (West 1970).

Marvin, supra note 5 at 665, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
Marvin, supra note 5 at 681, 557 P.2d at 120, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
Id., n. 19.
Supra, note 7.
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will then show that the court laid the foundation for new legisla-

tion to codify the broad principles of equity, fair play and equal
protection announced in Marvin. Finally, criticism of proposed
legislation illustrates that codification and clarification of Marvin must be responsibly drawn so as not to perpetuate the
unequal treatment of nonmarital families.
II.

A.

MARTIAL STATUS AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has only once, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,19
addressed itself to the issue of whether there are constitutional
grounds justifying the different statutory treatment accorded
persons on the basis of marital status. 20 In that case, the Court
held that a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the use of
contraceptives except by married persons 2 1 violated the equal
protection clause by providing dissimilar treatment for married
and unmarried persons who are similarly situated. 22 The analysis of the EisenstadtCourt in reviewing the statute is significant

in that it departs from well established guidelines previously
utilized by the Court. The two standards of review by which the
Court determines the constitutionality of state statutes challenged on equal protection grounds are commonly referred to
by the nature of the court's scrutiny. One, the "minimal
scrutiny" or traditional "rational basis" 23 test was cited by the
Court: "A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
19. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt,the defendant was convicted of violating a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives except by
married persons with proper authorization from a physician or pharmacy.
20. Id. at 447.
21. The statute in question provided imprisonment for "whoever... gives
away ... any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the prevention
of conception...", except as authorized in § 21A which provides, "[a] registered
physician may administer to or prescribe for any married person drugs or
articles intended for the prevention of pregnancy or conception. [A] registered
pharmacist actually engaged in the business of pharmacy may furnish such
drugs or articles to any married person presenting a prescription from a registered physician." Id. at 441, quoting MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 21 and 21A
(West 1970).
22. Eisenstadt,supra note 19 at 454.
23. There is a presumption when using the rational basis test, that the
classification is constitutional. If the court can conceive of any set of facts to
sustain the rationality of the classification, the statute will be upheld. F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).

must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. '24 Under
the other, "strict scrutiny" standard, 25 "statutory classifications
which either are based upon certain 'suspect' criteria 26 or affect
'fundamental rights' 27 will be held to deny equal protection un'28
less justified by a 'compelling' governmental interest.
The Eisenstadt Court applied an intermediate standard of
review, or "strict rationality" 29 test, in which the Court's
scrutiny is somewhat less rigorous than the compelling state
interest standard, yet less permissive than the rational basis
test. The Court rigorously scrutinized the Massachusetts statute
apparently without deference to the constitutional presumption
of validity, and rejected the argument that the statute was rationally related to the public interest in health and in promoting
premarital sexual intercourse.3" The fact that the statute challenged in Eisenstadt could not even withstand a review less
rigorous than the Court's strict standard indicates that the disparity of treatment accorded on the basis of marital status has
no constitutional validity. The Court seems to have used this
24. Eisenstadt, supra note 19 at 447, citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, supra note 23 at 415.
25. Using this strict standard, there is a presumption that the statutory
classification is unconstitutional, and "the state bears the burden of establishing
not only that it has a compelling interest which justified the law but that the
distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose." Westbrook
v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 785, 471 P.2d 487, 500-01, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 852-53,
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1970), vacated on other grounds.,403 U.S. 915 (1971).
See also, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
26. The following cases have established certain classifications as suspect:
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (race); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (national origin); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 371-72 (1971) and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (alienage). In
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973), four justices stated that sex is a
suspect class. The California Supreme Court in Sail'er Inn Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.
3d 1, 485 P. 2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) specifically held that sex is a suspect
class.
27. A number of cases used a strict scrutiny standard of review where
fundamental rights were involved. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,56162 (1964) (right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to
have children); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969) (right to travel).
28. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (dissenting opinion). See
Note, Developments in the Law- Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1969).
29. See Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 123
(1973). The term "strict rationality" has not been used by the Court. For a
discussion of the Court's application of this intermediate standard, see Fenimore, Equal Rights For Women: The Role of Affirmative Action, 9 Sw. L. REV.
177, 209 (1977).
30. Eisenstadt,supra note 19 at 448-52.
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approach for reasons of judicial convenience, 31 rather than to
have applied the strict test which presumes the invalidity of
statutes impinging on fundamental freedoms.
B.

Right of Privacy

Entry into a marital or nonmarital familial relationship involves the exercise of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court
has stated on numerous occasions that family life is a uniquely
private area in which individual decisions are protected against
governmental intrusion. 32 In Griswold v. Connecticut,33 the
Court struck down a statute prohibiting the distribution of
contraceptives to married persons as an unconstitutional infringement upon one's right to privacy. The Eisenstadt Court
cited Griswold in discussing the individual's right of access to
contraceptives, specifically, and right to privacy, generally.
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in
the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent
entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarrantedgovernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
34 affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.

The fundamental right of privacy includes several procreative rights 35 and parental rights, 36 which are as much a part of a
nonmarital family setting as they are a part of a marital situation. The nonmarried family must be presumed to have all of
the characteristics that make the married family unit constitu-

tionally protected: all familial-type relationships involve funda31. Id. at 447, n. 7. The Court deems it unnecessary to analyze the Massachusetts statute under the compelling state interest test "because the law fails
to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection standard."
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
33. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. Eisenstadt,supra note 19 at 453 (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, supra note 32 (abortion for a single woman) and
Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 32 (use of contraceptives).
36. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, supra note 32 (right to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home, and bring up children) and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, supra note 32 (right to send one's children to a private school
that offers specialized training).

mental decisions which determine the character of a person's
life; they are of a uniquely personal nature; they develop profound human relationships; and they generally center around
the home.
Two companion cases illustrating the application of constitutional protection to one's ability to make a decision crucial to his
or her personal life [i.e., the right to personal autonomy] are Roe
v. Wade 37 and Doe v. Bolton,38 both involving state criminal
abortion statutes. Justice Douglas concurring in the latter case
said, "That right [privacy] includes the privilege of an individual
to plan his own affairs, for outside areas of plainly harmful
conduct, every American is left to shape his own life
as he
'39
thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases.
C. Right of Association
Freedom of association, 40 while not explicitly stated in the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, is neverthe41
less implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition.
The right of association extends not only to political associations, but also to associations involving the social and economic
benefit of the members.4 2 This basic liberty is much more than
the right to attend a meeting, "It includes the right to express
one's attitudes or philosophies... ,,43 and would have no meaning if it did not also include the right to structure one's family in
the manner one chooses. 44 Statutes, which impinge upon such a
basic liberty, constitute invidious discrimination not tolerated
45
by the Constitution.
37. Roe v. Wade, supra note 32, at 113.
38. Id. at 179.
39. Id. at 213, citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I & XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I & II.
41. Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 32; see also 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130.
42. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); In re Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 612, 510 P. 2d 1017, 108
Cal. Rptr. 465 (1973).
43. Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 32, at 483, wherein the Supreme
Court stated that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance ... The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen." Id. at 484.
44. Surely if the penumbra of the first amendment freedom of association
extends to such broad categories as political, social, and legal association, or
succinctly, the right to associate, the protection would extend to the right to
build a family as one chooses. It would be an anomaly indeed if the first
amendment freedom of association did not fully cover such intimate relationships.
45. See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942) wherein the
Court noted, in holding the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act to be
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D.

Governmental Interest

If an individual has a fundamental right to structure his own
home life and decide with whom he wishes to live, then governmental action or inaction which seeks to place burdens upon the

exercise of such a right would appear to require compelling
justification. 46 The central inquiry pivots on whether the state
has a compelling interest which is furthered by the statutory
classification based on marital status. The obvious purpose for
marital classification is to promote and protect the institution of

marriage.

7

The Marvin court points out

that the structure of society itself largely depends upon the institution
of marriage, and nothing we have said in this opinion should be taken
to derogate from that institution. The joining of the man and woman
in marriage is at once the most socially productive and individually
48
fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in the course of a lifetime.

Since marriage has for so long been viewed as the backbone

of society, many of our laws dealing with the family relationship, and the obligations and responsibilities assumed therein,
are molded around the one dominating concept of marriage.
With the radical changes in contempory life styles which
characterized the development of the Marvin decision, the domination of marital consciousness no longer pervades today's
society. Nevertheless, if government insists on continuing the

public policy to promote marriage, the question becomes
whether the maintenance of legal distinctions based on marital
status is necessary to further that governmental interest.
In its treatment of the issue of the distribution of property, the
Marvin court addresses itself to this very inquiry, concluding
in violation of the equal protection clause, that deprivation of such a basic
liberty constituted "invidious discrimination."
46. The discussion which follows focuses on a strict scrutiny analysis. This
is in light of California's progressive stance regarding equal protection rights.
See, e.g., Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P. 2d 524, 5 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1971). While a "strict rationality" approach might be more proper pursuant to
federal standards (see note 29 supra and accompanying text), it is more appropriate to utilize a strict scrutiny standard. Doubtless, the result should remain
the same using either approach, since a strict rationality test would still demand
more than a "dubious relationship" between a legitimate purpose and its consequent effects.
47. Marvin, supra note 5 at 683, 557 P. 2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. See
also Deyoe v. Superior Court of Mendocino County, 140 Cal. 476, 482, 74 P. 28,
29-30 (1903).
48. Marvin, supra note 5 at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.

that "perpetuation of judicial rules which result in an inequitable distribution of property accumulated during a nonmarital
relationship is neither a just nor an effective way of carrying out
that policy [of promoting marriage]. '49 In short, the numerous
distinctions made between non-married and married persons
cannot possibly promote marriages generally. Indeed, the opposite conclusion could be inferred, since so many unmarried
cohabitors avoid marriage to benefit from certain laws which
irrationally distinguish between persons based on marital
status.5 0 Moreover, this stated policy itself requires re-evaluation, for if the statistics of broken marriages5 demonstrate anything meaningful, they indicate the government's policy has
been ineffectual. In the wake of such failure lies much more
than a broken marriage, for more often there is also a broken
family.
It is suggested then that the state's policy is really one of
promoting the family unit. At one time the concepts of the "family unit" and the "marital institution" were synonymous. 52 There
were no other acceptable alternatives to having a family, other
than through marriage. The Marvin case clearly repudiates
traditional mores by recognizing and accepting the prevalence
of nonmarital relationships. 53 The backbone of society has not
been weakened drastically, as it is still the family unit which
constitutes this core, not the institution of marriage. Since alternative familial relationships exist, these families must be pro49. Id. at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.

50. NEWSWEEK; August 1, 1977 at 48, wherein it was reported that an elderly
couple lived together for several months without getting married in order to
retain the social-security benefits each person received. The couple did marry,
and the woman's benefits were suspended.
Los Angeles Times, Nov. 13, 1977, Part V at 3, col. 1, wherein it was reported
that, in order to avoid a marriage tax penalty assessed against the couple where
each spouse contributes equally to the community income, one couple obtains
an annual year-end divorce in some foreign resort and uses the tax savings to
pay for the vacation and subsequent remarriage ceremony.
51. Supra, note 3.
52. These concepts were certainly synonymous in 1903 when Deyoe v.
Superior Court, supra note 47, was decided. Consider, for example, the statement of the Deyoe court, "[t]he well-recognized public policy relating to marriage is to foster and protect it, to make it a permanent and public institution, to
encourage the parties to live together, and to prevent separations and illicit
unions." Id. at 482, 74 P. 2d at 30. Additionally, it might be noted, California has
not recognized a common-law marriage as valid. See Annot. 35 A.L.R. 538, 551
(1925).
53. Marvin is the first to expressly recognize their acceptance. See, e.g., In
re Marriage of Cary, supra note 14 (where the court bases its determination on
interpretation of legislative intent); In re Estate of Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758,
119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975) (also based on interpretation of the Family Law Act);
Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975) (where the
court candidly refused to follow "straws in the wind").
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tected and promoted. Discriminatory treatment toward familial
alternatives cannot possibly further a policy that regards family
life so highly.
The state, arguably, has an interest in maintaining its exclusive franchise power over the marriage institution and the ceremonial requirements with respect thereto, in that the state is
thereby provided with a central registry of valuable records.
Such an interest still could not justify discriminatory treatment,
as the increasing multitude of nonmarital cohabitors demonstrates that54such records are either unnecessary or extremely
inaccurate.

Statutory distinctions based on marital status can no longer
be justified by abstract claims of protecting the "morality" of
citizens. Efforts to impose a particular moral code have been
rejected, especially when there is a significant divergence of
opinion among the public, as well as in the courts, as to what
constitutes "moral behavior.5 5 It is difficult therefore to
conceive of compelling state interest in the maintenance of
"morality" which will justify deprivation of fundamental rights
of privacy or liberty in matters related to marriage, family, and
sex.

56

III.

LEGISLATIVE TREND IN CALIFORNIA

Heretofore, California5 7 has dealt with unmarried couples
through the common law principles of contracts, property and
54. Unmarried persons, who have been living together, may be married by
a clergyman without the necessity of first obtaining health certificates or a prior
license. The marriage certificate may then be filed with the county clerk where
the ceremony was performed. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4213 (West Supp. 1977).
55. The United States is no longer a society in which any one social group or
culture has such a clear-cut hegemony that it can hold forth its moral standards,
its style of life, as the example for the rest to follow. See Gusfield, The Relation
of Social Science to Public Policy Toward Drugs, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, January 1975, at 1-15.
56. See, e.g., People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954,963-64,458 P.2d 194,199-200,80
Cal. Rptr. 354, 359-60 (1969) wherein the court discusses ramifications of the
general "right of privacy."
57. The subsequent discussion of the application of the equal protection
clause of-the U.S. Constitution applies to sections of the California Constitution
which have been held to be "substantially the equivalent" of the fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause.
CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 16(a) provides: "All laws of a general nature have a
uniform operation." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7(b) stipulates: "A citizen or class of

trusts; 58 there exists, however, very few statutes that deal specifically with nonmarital cohabitation. The trend of California law
dealing with children of unmarried parents reflects the state's

interest in dealing positively with alternative familial lifestyles
while still promoting the welfare of the family unit. Prior to
1975, California treated children born out of wedlock as illegitimate bastards.5 9 The natural parents of such children were
treated on an unequal basis, with the mother receiving favored
treatment. 60 The social opprobrium suffered by the hapless chil-

dren bearing the "illegitimate" label remained throughout their
lives unless legitimized by the father through a subsequent marriage to the mother 61 or through reception into the couple's
home in a public manner befitting a legitimate child. 62 For example, formerly, an illegitimate child could inherit part of the

estate of the mother's lineal or collateral
kindred but could not
63

likewise inherit from his father's line.
64
In 1975, California adopted the Uniform Parentage Act,
which defines the parent and child relationship15 and makes the
marital status of parents irrelevant. 66 Simultaneously, the legislature made the child's rights to succession dependent upon this
citizens may not be granted privilege or immunities not granted on the same
terms to all citizens." See also Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 596 n. 11,487 P. 2d
1241, 1249 n.ll, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609 n.ll (1971); Department of Mental Hygiene
v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 400 P.2d 321, 322, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330 (1965).
"The test for determining the validity of a statute where a claim is made that it
unlawfully discriminates against any class is substantially the same under the
state prohibitions against special legislation and the equal protection clause of
the Federal Constitution." Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 2d 378,
389, 196 P.2d 773, 781 (1948).
58. Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on
the Value of Homemakers'Services, 10 FAMILY L.Q. 101 (1976).
59. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 193-231 (West 1970) much of which has been
repealed by 1975 statutes.
60. See, e.g., former CAL. CIV. CODE § 200 (West 1954) (repealed by 1975 Cal.
Stats. ch. 1244, § 4). See additionally,CAL. CIV. CODE § 197 (West Supp. 1977).
61. See former CAL. CIV. CODE § 215 (West 1954) (repealed by 1975 Cal. Stats.
ch. 1244, § 5).
62. See former CAL. CIV. CODE § 230 (West 1954) (repealed by 1975 Cal. Stats.
ch. 1244, § 8).
63. See former CAL. PROB. CODE § 255 (West 1956) [current version at § 255
(West Supp. 1977) (added by 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. 1244, § 25)].
64. CAL. CIv. CODE, Part 7, §§ 7000 et seq. (West Supp. 1977) (added by 1975
Cal. Stats. ch. 1244, § 11).
65. CAL. Civ. CODE § 7001 (West Supp. 1977) which provides "...
[P]arent
and child relationship means the legal relationship existing between a child-and
his natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes
rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. It includes the mother and child relationship and the father and child relationship."
66. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7002 (West Supp. 1977) which provides "The parent and
child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless
of the marital status of the parents."
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parent and child relationship as opposed to the antiquated
status of illegitimacy. 67 This was the first instance in which a
state legislature specifically deemed marital status irrelevant to
68
the determination of rights incidental to the family existence.
In making the 1975 statutory changes, the California legislature clearly and consciously reflected the view of the Supreme
Court in its recent decisions involving illegitimate children. In
one of these cases a statutory provision preventing illegitimate
children from collecting workmen's compensation benefits for
the death of their father was held violative of the equal protection clause;6 9 in another case, a statute denying illegitimate children a wrongful death action for the death of their mother was
declared unconstitutional. 70 In the former case, the court
utilized the strict standard to scrutinize the state's interest in
"protecting 'legitimate family relationships"'' 7 1 and concluded

that statutory discrimination against illegitimate children, who
bear no responsibility for their birth, is not only unnecessary,
but does not even promote the state's policy. The Court, in a
third case, said, "To say that the test of equal protection should
be the 'legal' rather than the biological relationship is to avoid
the issue. ' 72 Clearly, these cases demonstrate the notion that
formalization through marriage is not a primary characteristic
of a family, a notion which dominates the 1975 statutory development in California.
In another area of the law, the California legislature recently
has made discrimination based on marital status unlawful. The
California Health and Safety Code Section 35720 provides that
"It shall be unlawful: 1. For the owner of any publicly assisted
housing accommodation ...to deny ...any person or group of
persons such housing accommodation because of the race,
color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin, or ancestry
of such person or persons. . . . ,73 The accompanying classifica67. Supra, notes 64 and 66.
68. The Uniform Parentage Act has also been adopted by Hawaii, Montana,
North Dakota, and Washington.
69. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
70. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
71. Weber v. Aetna Caualty & Surety Co., supra note 69 at 173.
72. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972), quoting Glona v. American
Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968).
73. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35720 (West Supp. 1977) (amended effective Jan. 1, 1976 by 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. 1189, § 3).

tions mentioned in this statute suggest that marital status may
be a suspect classification.7

4

Although no case has so held, the

mere suggestion further supports the position that discrimination based on such a classification is unconstitutional.
A California Court of Appeal 75 recently struck down, on equal
protection grounds, a housing regulation forbidding cohabitation by unmarried tenants as violative of California's Health
and Safety Code Section 35720. The court cited the Supreme
Court's holdings on the right of privacy, 76 as well as California's
recent legislative enactment, 77 but nevertheless used the minimal scrutiny test in concluding that the housing authority's classification "lacks the required rational basis. '78 Clearly, the
court found it unnecessary to scrutinize this particular classification any further.
Even though married persons continue to pay lower autoomobile insurance premiums than unmarried persons, there
have been several legislative attempts to preclude marital
status, in and of itself, from constituting a condition or risk for
which a higher rate may be required of the insured.7 9 Other
proposals to amend the California Insurance Code would also
prohibit marital status from effecting higher premiums for life
0
or disability insurance.

8

These examples of recent legislative and judicial action demonstrate California's willingness to deal with the increasing
number of people who are cohabiting without marriage and to
ameliorate the disparity of rights accorded such people. Although great strides have been made in removing the inequitable impediments denying the unmarried equal protection of
the laws, the California legislature has not as yet addressed
itself to unmarried persons' rights which are incidental to a
family situation.8 '
74. Supra, note 26.
75. Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority, 59 Cal. App. 3d 89,130 Cal.
Rptr. 375 (1976).
76. Supra, note 32.
77. Supra, note 73.
78. Atkisson, supra note 75 at 98, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
79. Former CAL. INS. CODE § 11628 (West 1972). See Cal. A.B. 1685, 1975 and
Cal. A.B. 3381, 1975 proposed during the 1975-76 Regular Session of the California Legislature.
80. CAL. INS. CODE § 10140 (West 1972). See A.B. No. 1902, 1975 proposed
during 1975-76 Regular Session of California Legislature.
81. Certain legislation has been introduced in the California State Senate;
however, the proposed statutory changes are only being investigated as this
article goes to print. See infra, note 97 and accompanying text.
Also, the California State Bar is presently studying several proposals drawn
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IV. A MISUNDERSTANDING OF MARVIN AND THE FAMILY LAW ACT
A vital step toward providing equal treatment for unmarried
families is to delineate what those familial rights are. The most
obvious guide is the Family Law Act, 8 which governs the rights,
obligations and responsibilities of married persons. A problem
was created, however, when the Marvin court ruled the Act
inapplicable to nonmarital situations. The bar's reaction to this
part of the Marvin case was to look away from the Family Law
Act due to a misunderstanding of the court's genuine message.
A brief discussion about the historical interaction between the
Family Law Act and nonmarital familial situations will provide
a proper perspective with which to understand the court's
analysis.
In 1973 in In re Marriageof Cary,8 3 the California Court of
Appeal, First District, held that the principle of equal division of
marital assets decreed by the Family Law Act applied also to a
nonmarital family relationship. The Cary court reasoned that if
a person, who by deceit leads another to believe a valid marriage exists between them, shall be legally guaranteed half of
the property they acquire,8 4 then two persons, who candidly
enter upon an unmarried family relationship with no deceitful
conduct, should not be denied property rights solely because of
the lack of a marital cermony.8 5 Thus Cary liberally interpreted
the Family Law Act in order to avoid an extremely inequitable
distribution of property. By so doing, Cary also held that the
Act supersedes the pre-1970 judicial rule announced in the Vallera86 and Keene8 7 cases. Then, in In re Estate of Atherley,88 the
by the 1977 Conference of Delegates to the State Bar Convention, which proposals will probably not be submitted to the legislature for another year.
82. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4000-5000 (West 1970).
83. Supra, note 15.
84. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West 1970).

85. Cary, supra note 15 at 352, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66. Commentators
criticized this reasoning, as noted in Marvin, supra note 5; see In re Cary: A
Judicial Recognition of Illicit Cohabitation,25 HASTINGS L.J. 1226, 1234-35
(1974) and Comment, In re Marriageof Carrey [sicl: The End of the PutativeMeretriciousSpouse Distinctionin California,12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 436, 444-46
(1975).
86. Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P. 2d 761 (1943): "The controversy
is thus reduced to the question whether a woman living with a man as his wife
but with no genuine belief that she is legally married to him acquires by reason
of cohabitation alone the rights of a co-tenant in his earnings and accumulations

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, agreed with Gary, saying that
the Cary rule had received implicit support from recent Calif or-

nia statutory changes aimed at curbing discrimination against
women. 89 Thereafter, to substantially confuse matters, the
Court of Appeal, Third District, held in Beckman v. Mayhew 90
that the legislature could not possibly have intended the result
reached in Cary and that the Vallera-Keene9 1 rule still applied.
In a decision which can be characterized as somewhat less than

courageous, the Beckman court recognized that developing social attitudes "may portend the crystallization of a public policy
inimical to the Vallera-Keene doctrine," 92 but then retreated
saying, "[W]e are not permitted to violate stare decisis for the

sake of straws in the wind.

93

during the period of their relationship. It has already been answered in the
negative. (Flanagan v. Capital National Bank, 213 Cal. 664, 3 P. 2d 307 (1931).)
Equitable considerations arising from the reasonable expectation of the
continuation of benefits attending the status of marriage entered into in good
faith are not present in such a case." 21 Cal. 2d at 684-85, 134 P.2d at 762-63. The
Vallera court also held that absent an express agreement, the woman was
entitled to share the property jointly accumulated, in the proportion that her
funds contributed to its acquisition.
87. Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962). The
rule and rationale announced in Vallera were reiterated by Keene wherein the
plaintiff relied on theories of constructive trust and resulting trust (Plaintiff did
not seek to recover reasonable value of her services on an implied contract
theory). The court said that the woman's services (assisting farm labor) consisted, at best, of improvements on real property, which do not raise a resulting
trust in her favor.
In his dissent, Justice Peters criticized the double standard adopted by the
majority and said that a woman's services as cook, housekeeper and homemaker, which would constitute sufficient consideration independent of cohabitation,
clearly will support a resulting trust in as much as a monetary contribution
would. 57 Cal. 2d at 674, 371 P.2d at 339-40, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 603-04 (dissenting
opinion).
88. In re Estate of Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975).
89. Id. at 769, n. 11, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
90. 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975).
91. The Vallera-Keene rule is a four part statement which states that:
(1) the female partner (or the male partner, whichever is the claiming party) gains no interest in a meretricious relationship; the
court not finding equity in such a circumstance;
(2) at its termination, the spouse claiming an interest from such a
relationship is entitled to share in the accumulated assets only if
there has been an express agreement to pool funds;
(3) in the absence of agreement, for the spouse claiming an interest
she must have contributed funds toward the acquisition of the
property;
(4) there shall be no monetary credit for domestic services rendered; in other words, domestic services performed are not
funds in the sense of "contribution of funds" to help acquire
property.
Comment, The Scope of Equity with Respect to Non-Marital Relationships, 5
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 49, 53 (1977).

92. Supra, note 90 at 535, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
93. Id.
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The California Supreme Court was thus asked in Marvin to
resolve the conflicting positions taken by the state's intermediate appellate courts. The conclusion in Marvin that "[t]he
provisions of the Family Law Act do not govern the distribution

of property acquired during a nonmarital relationship

.

.

.

94

has created still more confusion for the bar because it appears
that the court has refused to accord the status of "family" to the
family setting within the nonmarital relationship. Such a belief
is erroneous, since Marvin holds nothing of the kind.
The Marvin decision properly limits the role of the judiciary
to interpreting what the legislature says, not what the legislature failed to say. There is no indication, either in the legislative
history of the Family Law Act, nor in the language of the Act
itself, which suggests that the subject of nonmarital cohabitation was considered by the legislature at the Act's inception in
1969.95 As Marvin points out, the delineation of the rights of
nonmarital partners previously had been fixed entirely by judicial decision.9 6 But in 1969 there were no compelling reasons for
the legislature to alter the status quo. Acceptance of nonmarital
cohabitation was simply not the prevailing mood of the day. In
agreeing with Beckman, the court in Marvin performed a proper judicial function, holding that any inference drawn from the
Family Law Act that the legislature intended to include nonmarital cohabitors improperly extends application of the Act.
There is, however, no basis for the belief that the court intended to deny rights incidental to marriage to unmarried families.
The court simply could not grant these rights through the utilization of the Family Law Act, because the Act clearly does not
deal with such rights. What the court in Marvin did say was that
it would not apply the Family Law Act to nonmarital family
relationships until the legislature acted to bring such a relationship within the ambit of the Act. Marvin lays the foundation for
new legislation by recognizing that the prevalence of nonmarital relationships is no "straw in the wind," by clearly abrogating
the Vallera-Keene doctrine, and by granting relief based upon
any equitable basis warranted by the facts.
94. Marvin, supra note 5 at 665, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
95. The Family Law Act became effective January 1, 1970.
96. Marvin, supra note 5 at 681, 557 P.2d at 120, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829.

The Marvin conclusion that the Family Law Act does not
apply to nonmarital relationships should not encourage legislation to negate the ramifications of the Marvin case. The legislation presently introduced in the state Senate is antithetical to
the very spirit of Marvin.97 This bill would create a presumption
that property and earnings of an unmarried couple remain separate unless acquired jointly or under some formal agreement.
The bill would also prohibit trial courts from considering
whether a couple was cohabitating in determining the existence
of contractual obligations.
Although the legislature has demonstrated a sincere desire to
clarify some of the complex legal issues raised by the Marvin
decision, the language of this bill appears more in the nature of
repeal than clarification. Marvin specifically directs trial
judges to examine the conduct of the parties to a relationship, in
the absence of express agreements, in order to determine their
respective rights and reasonable expectations.9 8 Prohibiting
trial courts from considering the parties' cohabitation is an unrealistic giant step backwards. It is precisely cohabitation, encompassing a basic love relationship and involving special trust,
loyalty and confidentiality, that creates the equities and
contractual considerations in a Marvin-type relationship.
Further, the present bill would void Marvin rights in the event
of a subsequent marriage. This would create great injustice for
the couple who cohabit several years before entering into a
marriage that lasts only six months. It would also impose on the
judiciary the difficult task of determining whether the subsequent marriage was entered into for the purpose of avoiding
pre-marital obligations. The present legislative proposal falls
critically short of codifying the broad principles of equity, fair
play and equal protection announced in Marvin. The bill
completely fails to recognize the existence of a familial relationship created by nonmarital cohabitation and makes no attempt
to provide protection for the members of that family.
Critics of the Marvin case, who insist on treating cohabitors
as business partners, refuse to accept the fact that "marriage" is
no longer in the vocabulary of many people who nonetheless
wish to have familial relationships. The prevalence and judicial
acceptance of nonmarital partners marks this as a time in which
a whole new class of persons requires laws which treat them as
fairly and equally as those similarly situated. Any legislation
97. Cal. S.B. 822, 1977, quoted in Appendix A.
98. Supra, note 6.
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enacted to clarify the complexities of the Marvin decision must
provide rights and duties for the unmarried similar to the provisions of the Family Law Act. 99 Legislators must keep in mind
that equal treatment is constitutionally mandated.
While other states without a Family Law Act apply Marvin
with its full force and effect, to provide equal distribution of
property to parties dissolving their nonmarital familial relationship, 100 it would be extremely unfortunate for California to retreat from Marvin simply because the legislature failed to consider and include in the Act, the class of individuals who, though
unmarried, cohabitate in a familial relationship. Many attorneys strongly favor legislation that will codify the broad principles so boldly drawn by the Marvin court, but the legislation
must be drawn in a responsible manner. The Marvin opinion,
which has been described as a model code for protecting the
fundamental property rights of more than two million' 01 Americans who have chosen this increasingly popular alternative lifestyle, should be followed, not repealed.
V.

CONCLUSION

Prior to concluding his opinion in Marvin, Justice Tobriner
stated, "nothing we have said in this opinion should be taken to
derogate from that [marriage] institution."'10 2 He continued, saying that marriage was the most socially productive relationship
one can enjoy in a lifetime. 10 3 The court, however, must also
have recognized that for some half million'014 people per year in
California the institution of marriage has become one of the
most psychologically destructive forces in their lifetime, by an99. The Conference of Delegates to the 1977 State Bar Convention have
recommended to the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California that the
State Bar sponsor legislation to create an Unmarried Cohabitors Act. The Act
proposed tentatively includes a rebuttable presumption that two unmarried
adults of the opposite sex jointly occupying the same dwelling unit, assume the
rights, duties and obligations usually manifested by married persons. Such
legislation would be much more in the spirit of the Marvin decision. Since the
proposals require further study and clarification, it is likely that the State Bar
will not sponsor this legislation for at least another year.
100. Supra, note 9.
101. Marrying,Divorcingand Living Together in the United States Today,
Population Reference Bureau, Inc.
102. Marvin, supra note 5 at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
103. Id.
104. Supra, note 3.

nouncing that nonmarital familial cohabitation is a socially acceptable alternative to marriage.
By providing broad equitable and contractual relief to the
dependent partner of a nonmarital relationship, Marvin has
made the first great strides toward providing equal protection
of the law for unmarried cohabitors. Discriminatory treatment
heretofore accorded such persons on the basis of marital status
can no longer be justified as promoting the institution of marriage. In the years ahead, legislative treatment of unmarried
cohabitors will face rigorous challenges and must therefore be
couched in terms to withstand strict judicial scrutiny. California's legislature, which has already demonstrated a trend toward prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status,
should remain at the forefront of this legal development by
providing for parents and children the rights and obligations
which inhere in their status as members of a family.
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APPENDIX A
AMENDED IN SENATE SEPTEMBER 8,1977
SENATE BILL

No. 822
Introduced by Senator Song
April 4, 1977

An act to add Section 43 Section 43.1, 43.2, and 43.3 to the Civil Code, relating
to personal rights.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

SB 822, as amended, Song. Personal rights.
Existing law declares various personal rights possessed by persons.
This bill would prohibit a court, in determining the rights of the parties with
:zajzzt to an~y transeetir. whatso.ever, fm eensidering the feet that atte
P&-es, wh.ths r Moan or fmalc, wcro ehabting, and iJ mal and fcmale, were
not married to each other. existence of contractual or equitable obligations
from consideringwhether the parties, if unmarried to each other, are or were
cohabiting together.
It would specify that the above provision shall not be construed as validating
any contract the consideration for which is meretricious sexual services.
It would also create a rebuttablepresumption that each member of a couple
living together intended to keep his or her earningsandproperty separateand
independent if specified conditions are complied with, except as to the ownership of property acquired with the contributions of funds or services from
both members of the couple.
It would also declare that the act of marriageshall void all equitable rights
and contractual obligations not expressed in writing which may have been
created between the spouse prior to the marriage.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. State-mandated local program: no.
The people of the State of Californiado enact as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 4& 43.1 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
43. (a) Netw saning any ether pfrzvision of law, a ae-A, in determining the
Fight as the 6 e--i-.iper" c
t to any.... fran..,
Wha4-,zze^^ . , h.. not e.
aider the faet that auch par~za, whether male or ScmAbo, wel ohbpegani
male and female, we~-re "at married te eaek ether.
43.1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in determining
the existence of contractual or equitable obligations shall consider whether
the parties, if unmarried to each other,are or were cohabiting together.
SEC. 2. Section 43.2 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
43.2. (a) Each member of a couple cohabiting together in compliance with
all of the following conditions shall be presumed to have intended to keep his
or her earnings and property separate and independent:
(1) The couple was not married to each other and mutually agreed not to
marry.
(2) The couple made no express agreement as to the joint ownership of the
property of either member.
(3) Each member of the couple was, or intended to be, financially selfsupporting during the time of the cohabitation.
(4) Neither member of the couple represented to others on a regularbasis
that he or she was married to the other member.
(b) Subdivision(a)shall not apply in determining the ownership of property
acquired with the contributionsof funds, property, or services from both members of the couple.

(c) The presumption established by subdivison (a) is a presumption affecting the burden of proof, as defined in Section 605 of the Evidence Code.
SEC. 3. Section 43.3 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
43.3 (a) The act of marriageshall void all equitable rightsand contractual
obligations not expressed in writing which may have been created between the
spouses prior to the marriage.
(b) Subdivision (a) shall not apply where a spouse enters into the marriage
for the purpose of voiding contractual or equitable obligations.
(c) Subdivision (a) shall not apply in determining the ownership of property
acquired with the contributions of funds, property, or services from both
spouses prior to their marriage.

